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CONSORTIUM AND THE COMMON LAW
Uncertainty is fundamental to human life and existence,
and has been the only universally predictable element of all
experience since the beginning; yet, in the quest for endur-
ance and prevailance, there is a fundamental necessity for
stability, for there must be some verity, even though an illu-
sion, to meet the challenge.1 The rules of conduct which gov-
ern the smaller lives of men reflect this conflict, and law is
established primarily to provide stability and certainty in a
system which, without it, is intrinsically variable and capri-
cious, for, in order to establish and maintain profitable and
peaceful intercourse, there must be rules which can be relied
upon. All laws cannot be immutable, however, since interests
must be protected as they exist: as a society changes, some
of its laws must have the capacity to change also, or they will
fail. Certain areas of the law appear to be invariable: no
doubt there will always be the necessity of an acceptance to
every offer in order to form a contract. In such cases, reli-
ance upon prior decisions is the best assurance of both justice
and security. On the other hand, the law of torts changes
with each new decision, and history has little effect, overall,
other than to trace the developing trend. Thus the rule of
stare decisis is often tempered by society's reassessment of
the interest tried, and the rock of precedent is carved by
time.2
In 1231, in England, a wife could not sue for the loss of her
husband's consortium due to the negligence of another;8 in
1962, in South Carolina, she still cannot maintain the action.'
The Supreme Court of South Carolina joined the great
majority of jurisdictions by denying her the action, and fol-
1. "I am the Lord, I change not." Malachi 3:6.
2. "'Cursed,' saith the law, 'is he that removeth the land-mark. The
mislayer of a mere-stone is to blame.' But it is the unjust judge that in
the capital remover of landmarks, when he defineth amiss of lands and,
property." BACON, OF JUDIcATURE 1 (c.1618).
3. BRACTON, DE LEGMUS ET CONSUnTUDINIBus ANGLIAE, Folio 155,
2 (apud Richard Tottellum, London 1569).
4. Page v. Winter, 240 S.C. 516, 126 S.E.2d 570 (1962).
5. "In the absence of statute, a wife has no cause of action for-
any loss sustained by her, including loss of consortium, in consequence
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lowed the logic of many others8 by holding that the wife had
no right to her husband's consortium at the common law, and
that "since there has been no legislative action in this state
relating to the matter, we must be governed by the policy of
the common law."7
Two issues arise from the decision: the first is a question
of historical interpretation - whether or not the wife was, in
fact, without a right to consortium at the common law. The
second question is whether the Supreme Court of South
Carolina should be bound to adhere to the statutes and case
laws of England as they existed prior to the passage of the
Act of 1712,8 which adopted the common law of England as
the common law of South Carolina. It should be noted at the
beginning that there is a third issue, concealed in the twilight
of judicial analysis, which has some effect upon the decision
in this case: whether or not this area of tort liability should
be extended to include the injury to the wife, an injury which
is considered remote and incompensable by many courts. 9
The important issue presented by Page v. Winter is not
one of case interpretation, nor a judgment of social neces-
sity, but the fundamental question of self-imposed limitation
of decision by a judicial body, which, though inadvertent,
becomes inflexible from its nature as a limitation; not only
the rule of stare decisis, but the additional recital that stare
decisis must be applied.
I.
Domestic interests, while real and valuable, are poorly
defined and difficult to evaluate, and domestic problems
are also social problems, with quasi-legal aspects, which have
been dominantly and beneficially controlled by forces other
than the law. Yet the law is required as an aid and control
in many areas of domestic relations. It has been said that,
"Whatever else marriage is, it is and will always be a creature
of the law."' 0 Interests in the marriage extend to all princi-
6. Smith v. United Constr. Workers, 271 Ala. 42, 122 So.2d 153
(1960); Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1952); Seagraves v. Legge,
127 S.E.2d 605 (W.Va.1962).
7. Page v. Winter, 240 S.C. 518, 126 S.E.2d 572 (1962).
8. S.C. Rnv. STAT. 1872, c. 146, §10.
9. Giggey v. Gallagher Trans. Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P.2d 1100 (1937);
Emerson v. Taylor, 133 Md. 192, 104 Atl. 538 (1918); Feneff v. New
York Cent. & H. R. Ry., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909).
10. SE- cTm ESSAYS ON FAMILY LAW iv (Sayre ed. 1950).
2
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pal family members, and are among the most valuable and
powerful of all social relationships, but only recently has
there been an indication that the interests of the wife and
child in these bonds might receive protection comparable
to that afforded to the husband.1
Actions for intentional interference with the marital rela-
tionship have been available to the husband since early
history,12 and to the wife, generally, since the passage of the
Married Women's Property Acts.' 3 Actions for enticement,
alienation of affections and similar causes are based upon a
loss of consortium,14 and are as much means of control as
they are repairitive causes.'3
The husband has had recourse for negligent interference
with the marriage since the middle of the nineteenth
century,'( but a similar action was not available to the wife
in any jurisdiction of common law origin until 1950-17 As in
11. Miller v. Mousen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949); annot.
59 A.L.R.2d 455 (1958); annot. 12 A.L.R.2d 1180 (1950).
12. Vernon v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 218 S.C. 402, 63 S.E.2d 53
(1951); see also Cook v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 196 S.C. 230, 13 S.E.2d
1 (1941) and 4 INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 4. II.
13. Married Women's Property Act of 1895 (S.C. CoNsT. of 1895
art. 17, §9); see also Holloway v. Holloway, 204 S.C. 565, 30 S.E.2d 596
(1944); Messervy v. Messervy, 82 S.C. 559, 64 S.E. 753 (1908); PRossER,
TORTS §103 (2d ed. 1955).
14. Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L.C. 577, 588, 131 Rev.Rep. 347, 426 (1861).
15. "The threat to individual interests of substance of defendants
from collusion between the spouses from false or engineered charges has
proved to be great, and there has been a trend in some states to abolish
the actions altogether and leave these claims to the protection of morals."
STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAw 526 (1950); see also
Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on the Heart Balm, 33 MICH.L.Rv. 979
(1935).
16. Brockbank v. The Whitehaven Junction Ry., 7 H.&N. 835, 150
Eng.Rep. 706 (1862).
17. Hipp v. DuPont Co., 189 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318, 18 A.L.R. 873 (1921)
allowed the action previously but was overruled by Hinnant v. Tide
Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307, 37 A.L.R. 889 (1925).
In 1950, the leading case of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 23
A.L.R.2d 1366 (D.C.Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852, 95 L.Ed. 624,
permitted suit by the wife. Since that decision, two federal district courts
and seven state courts have allowed the action by the wife: Duffy v.
Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F.Supp. 71 (D.Mont. 1961); Cooney v.
Moomaw, 109 F.Supp. 448 (D.Neb. 1953) modified by Luther v. Maple,
250 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1958) but reinstated by Guyton v. Soloman De-
hydrating Co., 302 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1962); Missouri-Pacific Trans. Co.
v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 229 S.W.2d 41 (1957); Yonner v. Adams, 167
A.2d 717 (Del. 1961); Brown v. Georgia-Tenn. Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga.App.
519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1957); Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.W.2d
881 (1960); Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 408 (1956);
Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1961); Hoekstra
v. Helgeland, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d 669 (1959). Without comment on
the consortium question, Delta Chevrolet Co. v. Waird, 211 Miss. 256,
3
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the case for an intentional violation, the action for negligence
is also based upon an act per quod consortium amisit - by
which consortium is lost.'
8
Literally translated, consortium means "casting lots to-
gether,"'19 and at the Roman law, consortium was regarded
as the essence of the marriage.20 There is disagreement
among modern authorities as to what legal connotation
should be given to the term. Acceptance of such a definition
as "the conjugal fellowship of husband and wife and the
right of each to the company, cooperation and aid of the other
in every conjugal relationship," 21 indicates that the right to
consortium is a mutual interest of both husband and wife.
It has been one of the main contentions of those jurisdictions
which presently allow the wife to bring the action that the
right has always been a mutual one, but enforcement was not
available to the wife at common law because of the disability
of converture. Logically, the Married Women's Property Act
removed this procedural disability, and in so doing, gave the
wife the ability to sue for the loss. 22  However, another
definition has been developed, based upon the traditional
concept of the status of the wife at the common law: that the
wife was the chattel of her husband, with no rights or stand-
ing at law, and that all of the husband's interests in her were
interests of substance, dominantly, her domestic service. Since
a wife has no interest in the domestic service of her husband,
the right is and was exclusively his, and the wife gained no
new right of this kind from the removal of the disability of
coverture.
23
Authority relating to this question is scarce, and the basis
51 So.2d 443 (1951), stated that the jury was warranted to consider
"damages resulting from loss of society and companionship" of the hus-
band to make award to the wife and children, 51 So.2d 447. See also
ORE. REV. STAT. §108.010 (1955).
18. III BLACKSTONE, CommENTARiS 8. 139; see Weedon v. Timbrell,
St. R. 357, 101 Eng.Rep. 199 (1793).
19. CASSELL, LATIN-ENGLISH DIcTIoNARY (1958).
20. "Coniunctio marls et feminae et consortium omnis vitae, divinae
et humani iuris communicatio." 23 DIGEsT OF JUSTINIAN, MODESTINUS,
2. I.; see also BUCKLAND & McNAiR, RoMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW
(1936).
21. Flendermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102, 105 (1908);
see Messervy v. Messervy, 204 S.C. 565, 30 S.E.2d 596 (1944), and 41
C.J.S. Husband and Wife §11 (1944).
22. Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, Inc., supra note 17.
23. Boden v. Del Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933);
Feneff v. New York Cent. & H. Ry., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909).
1963] 813
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of either interpretation, at its origin, is narrow and spec-
ulative.
The earliest reported case presently available which dealt
with a separate cause of action by either spouse was Chomndj
and Conges Case,2 1 decided in 1586, in which the husband sued
for the battery of his wife. The defense was that the husband
must join his wife in the suit; in a brief decision, the court
allowed the suit without joinder.
In 1618, the case of Guy v. Livesey25 was reported in more
detail, and was an action brought by the husband against the
defendant "for that he assaulted and beat the wife of the
plaintiff, per quod consortium uxoris suce for three days
amisit."2 6 In reply to the defense of non-joinder, the court
held that the action was brought "for the particular loss of
the husband, for that he lost the company of his wife, which
is only a damage to himself, for which he shall have this
action, as the master shall have for the loss of his servant's
service." 2 7 Again, in 1619, the separate action was affirmed
in Hyde v. Scyssor,28 which held that "the action is not
brought for the battery of the wife, but for the loss and
damage of the husband, for want of her company and aid."29
One of the earliest references to this concept of derivative
injury was made by Bracton,3 0 c.1131, and, although he
suggests a slightly different basis for the action than the
cases outlined, apparently the type of suit was the same and
was permitted prior to the sixteenth century:
One may suffer damage not only through his own
injury, however, but also through others over whom he
has power, as through his children and his wife. Thus a
husband may bring an action for the damage done to
his wife, but not the contrary. This is proper, for a wife
to be defended by her husband, but not a husband by
his wife. In a similar manner, one suffers damage
through those he has in his household, such as his
subjects and his servants, if they have been struck or
24. 4 Leon 88, 74 Eng.Rep. 748 (1586).
25. Cro. Jac. 501, 79 Eng.Rep. 428 (1618).
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Cro. Jac. 538, 79 Eng.Rep. 462 (1619).
29. Ibid.
30. BRACTON, DE LEGiBus ET CoNsuEUDINIBus ANGLIAE, supra note 3.
[Vol. 15
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beaten as an outrage to him, or insofar as it was to
his interest not to have lacked in their work.31
Perhaps the most often cited early authority for the view
that the basis of the husband's action was loss of services
is Blackstone, writing his Commentaries after the decision
of Hyde v. Scyssor.32 Blackstone summarized the basis of the
action in much the same manner as these early cases, also
drawing the procedural analogy made in Guy v. Livesey.33
BIackstone observed that the actions for loss of consortium
and loss of servitium accrued to the superior - parent,
husband, master or guardian - rather than to the inferior
child, wife, servant or ward:
•.. one reason for which may be this: that the inferior
hath no kind of property in the company care or assist-
ance of the superior... and therefore the inferior can
suffer no loss or injury. The wife cannot recover dam-
ages for [the] beating [of] her husband, for she hath no
separate interest in anything during her coverture. 34
It is difficult to establish the basis of Blackstone's
grouping of these "inferiors" into one class, as well as the
basis of his statement that the wife had no separate interests
during her coverture. In fact, the wife did have separate in-
terests,35 not the least of which her husband, of whom
she was seised. 6 Also, the unity of being concept, that the
husband and wife were one person in the law, has been
explained to some degree.3' However, major authorities are
31. Ibid. Translated with the assistance of Prof. Ruby M. Ott, Dept.
of Foreign Languages, U.S.C. Original text: "Patitur autem iniuriam
quis, non souinm per seipsum ,sed etiam per alios quos habet in potestate,
sicut per liberos suos, et uxoram suam. Vir autem agere poterit de iniuria
facta uxori suae, sed non e contrario. Defendi enin uxorem a viro, pon
virun ab uxore dignu est. Item in iniuriam patitur quis, per illos quos
in famillia sua habuerit, sieut servientes suos et servos, si pulsati fuerint,
et verberati in contumeliam suam, vel quatenus sua interfuit operibus
eorum non caruisse."
32. Cro. Jac. 538, 79 Eng.Rep. 462 (1619).
33. Cro. Jac. 501, 79 Eng.Rep. 428 (1618).
34. I1 BLACxsTONE, COMMENTARiES 8. 143.
35. Dower, for instance; the concept was early stated by BRACTON,
supra note 3 at folio 429b, "For the thing is the wife's own, and the
husband is guardian."
36. II POLL0CK & MArrLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 147 (1898).
37. "Quia una caro sunt vir et uxor." GLANmmm, DE CONSUETUDINIsus
rT LEumus REGNI ANGLiAE 14. 3.; "The law looks upon the husband and
the wife as but one person." I BACON, ABRIDGEMENT 694 (1832); "The
wife was not reduced to a position in law of, say, a dog." Williams, The
Legal Unity of Husband and Wife, 10 MoD.L.REv. 16 (1947).
19631
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somewhat contradictory as to just what position the wife
occupied at the common law. Statements by Glanville,
Blackstone and Holdsworth have been interpreted as
indicating that the wife was virtually powerless, that "... . all
show that the action which the law gives the husband for loss
of consortium is founded on the proprietary right which from
ancient times it was considered the husband had in his -wife.
It was in fact based on the same ground that gave a master
a right to sue for an injury to his servant."38 The following
expression of the popular concept of the wife's place at com-
mon law conforms to this view.
At common law the husband had almost absolute
control over the person of his wife; she was in a position
of complete dependence; she could not contract in her
own name; was bound to obey; she had no will of her
own and legal existence was merged into that of her hus-
band so that they were termed and regarded as one in
the law, "the husband being that one. 39
Clearly, certain factual elements of the wife's legal disability
cannot be disputed, and it is probable that the wife was
regarded by the law as subject to her husband's authority.
40
But she was not devoid of rights, nor do authorities such as
Chaucer and Shakespeare show that the wife occupied a
position of substantial actual subservience.41 What seems to
be one of the best summaries of the husband and wife rela-
tionship during the middle ages is found at the conclusion of
Pollock and Maitland's discussion of domestic relations in
their HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW:
If we look for any one thought which governs the whole
of this province of law, we shall hardly find it. In
particular, we must be on guard against the common
38. Best v. Samuel Fox Co. (1952) A.C. 716; see 8 HOIDSWORTH,
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 147.
89. King v. City of Owensboro, 187 Ky. 21, 218 S.W. 297, 801 (1920).
40. "Clearly a wife was regarded as being subject to her husband's
authority; and it is probable that the guardianship which he thus ex-
ercised led to incapacity to her own property. That incapacity, in turn,
led to her inability to contract, or to sue or be sued without joining her
husband." Brett, Consortium et Servitium, 29 AuST.L.ouR. 322 (1955).
41. "And whau that I had getten unto me,
By mistrie, al the soveraynetee
And that he seyde, 'Myn owne trewe wyf,
Do as thee lust the terme of al thy lyf.
Keep thyn honour, and keep eek myn estaat.'
After that day we hadden never debaat." CHAucER, THE WIFE oF BATH'S
PRowuE (c.1370); see SHAxESPEARE, THE TASzNG oF THE SHREW (1594).
[Vol. 15
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belief that the ruling principal is that which sees an
'unity of person' between husband and wife... a consist-
ently operative principle it can not be. We do not treat the
wife as a thing or as somewhat that is neither thing
nor person .... The husband is the wife's guardian :-that
we believe to be the fundamental principle; and it
explains a great deal, when we remember that guar-
dianship is a profitable right .... But... we can not
explain the marital relationship as being simply the
subjugation of the wife to the husband's will .... To this
we must add that there is a latent idea of community
between husband and wife which can not easily be
suppressed.4 2
Apart from the contradictory historical basis, many courts
have denied this action to the wife on other grounds, all of
which evince a reluctance to expand the tort-feasor's liability
to members of the injured's family.
Many courts have held that an action by the wife for loss
of consortium would result in a double recovery.43 Since the
husband supposedly recovers for any loss of ability to fulfill
his marital obligations through his own action, the wife is
also compensated, and any additional recovery by her would
be excessive. Conversely, others have held that the injury is
a double loss, 44 for which each should recover, and that
instructions to the jury could limit either party's award to
preclude duplication of damages. 45
Other jurisdictions take the position that the wife's injury
is too remote to be compensable, 46 that damages are intended
to compensate the injured for direct consequences of the
wrong,47 and since the wife has no pecuniary interest in her
husband's services, 48 she suffers no injury to an interest of
substance. While the question of services is unsettled, it has
been pointed out that there is an inconsistency in allowing the
husband to sue for the loss while withholding the action from.
42. 11 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 36 at 405ff.
43. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §695 (1934); see Hartmann v. Cold Spring
Granite Co., 247 Minn. 515, 77 N.W.2d 651 (1956).
44. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C.Cir. 1950).
45. Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F.Supp. 448 (D.Neb. 1953).
46. Gambrino v. Manufacturers Coal & Coke Co., 175 Mo.App. 653,
158 S.W. 77 (1913).
47. Howard v. Verdigris Valley Elec. C-op., 201 OkI. 504, 207 P.2d
784 (1949).
48. Boden v. Del Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933).
1963]
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the wife on the basis of remoteness, 49 however, it appears
to be equally anomalous to allow recovery by one and not the
other in any case.50 In addition, South Carolina, 1 and sub-
stantially all other jurisdictions5 2 have allowed the wife to
bring an action for intentional interference with the marriage
relation since the passage of the Married Women's Acts, on
the basis that the Acts gave new rights to the wife. 3 Since
the basis of these actions is also a loss of consortium," there
has been some uncertainty as to why the wife of an adulterous
husband has the right to his consortium, which does not
extend to her when he is injured negligently."
Finally, a few courts have stated that the interest in
,consortium, as a whole, is at issue, and that the question is
whether this element of damage is compensable."6 The argu-
ments utilized are similar to those involved in the issues sur-
rounding pain and suffering, mental anguish, and other non-
pecuniary injuries.27 These courts have decided the question
,with equal consideration to the interests of the husband and
-the wife.
One of the most compelling propositions in support of the
position that the wife had no right to consortium at the
common law also expose one of the primary sources of
confusion in the entire inquiry. In Page v. Winter, the court
stated that "if such a right had existed under the common
law, the wife could have maintained the action prior to the
Married Women's Property Act by simple joinder of the
husband."9 8 Such a suggestion would probably have had the
!same effect upon a common law attorney as the suggestion
to a contemporary lawyer that he submit his pleadings
written in longhand9 and appear in court habited in a black
coat.60 The impracticality of such a solution is evident. The
husband had a right to his wife's choses in action, and would
49. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1961).
50. Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d 669 (1959).
51. Messervy v. Messervy, 82 S.C. 559, 64 S.E. 753 (1908).
52. PROSSER, TORTS, §103 (2d ed. 1955).
63. Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621, 34 Am.Rep. 397 (1878).
54. Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 408 (1956).
55. Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1961).
56. Marri v. Stamford Street Ry., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911).
57. Martin v. United Elea. Ry., 71 R.I. 137, 42 A.2d 897 (1945).
58. Page v. Winter, 240 S.C. 516, 126 S.E.2d 570 (1962).
59. S.C. Cm. CT. R. 13.
60. Id. R. 8.
[Vol. 15
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have recovered for the loss of his own consortium."' In addi-
tion, an interesting situation would have resulted if the
husband had joined his wife in an enticement action against
his own mistress. 62 Thus the difficulty in reaching any
supportable conclusion to the question is largely due to the
vast changes which have taken place in the law with respect
to domestic relations. The few cases which are available
offer little information of a practical nature, and in all proba-
bility, the question will never be fully answered. The law re-
flects the attitudes of those who apply it, and a true under-
standing of the actual result of a rule of law in an earlier
time is difficult, if not impossible, to determine.
II.
Every judicial decision based upon facts requires some de-
gree of creative analysis, since no two factual situations are
ever completely consistent. Over a period of time, recurring
situations become classified, and applied rules become fa-
miliar as they are developed, and, from a purely logical as-
pect, law naturally tends toward codification. But this
natural tendency is not the sole regulator; there is a policy
inherent, founded on the theory that security and certainty
require that accepted and established legal principles, under
which rights accrue, be recognized and followed, which de-
mands stability.6 3 Yet the circumstances out of which law is
formed are constantly changing, and, even though the letter
of the law may remain the same, application alters with the
time and circumstances. Thus there are two urges: law
must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still.64
The law of our day faces a two-fold need. The first is
the need of some restatement which will bring certainty
out of a wilderness of precedent. This is the task of
legal science. The second is the need of a philosophy
that will mediate between the conflicting claims of sta-
bility and progress, and supply a principle of growth.65
61. "No recovery could be had without joining the husband in the
suit, who himself must receive the money, which would not advance the
wife's remedy." Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L.C. 577, 588 (1861).
62. "For an alienation of affections suit, a wife was doubly barred
at common law (a) because she could not sue for any tort without her
husband's joinder, and (b) because he was not permitted to join her in
a suit for that specific tort." Yonner v. Adams, 167 A.2d 717 (Del. 1961).
63. Otter Tail Power Co. v. VonBank, 72 N.D. 497, 8 N.W.2d 599,
145 A.L.R. 1343 (1942).
64. RoscoE PouND.
65. CAmwozo, THE GRowTH OF TH LAW 1 (1927).
819
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The rule of Page v. Winter compels adherence to the com-
mon law of England as it existed prior to the Act of 1712,66
except as changed by legislative enactment. This is not an
unfamiliar application of the rule of stare decisis, however,
the rule has not been applied so strictly in any previous
South Carolina case. Stare decisis is of unquestioned value
and validity in the common law system, but only insofar as
reliance upon prior decisions does not defeat justice.
67
I am ready to concede that the rule of adherence to prec-
edent, though it ought not to be abandoned, ought to
be in some degree relaxed. I think that when a rule,
after it has been duly tested by experience, has been
found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or
with the social welfare, there should be less hesitation
in frank avowal and full abandonment.68
Stare decisis is an ethical, rather than a logical, considera-
tion.09 However, some courts have regarded the rule as com-
pelling strict logical analysis of prior decisions and appli-
cation of the developed rule in every case.1 0 Philosophically,
consistency is the essence of legal certainty, but "the prop-
osition that courts ought always to decide 'in accordance
with precedent or statute' is an ethical proposition, the
truth of which can only be demonstrated by showing that in
every case the following of statute or precedent does less
66. Page v. Winter, 240 S.C. 516, 126 S.E.2d 570 (1962); S.C. Rzv.
STAT. 1872, c.146, §10.
67. "In applying the rules [of the English common law], we must
take care that they do not violate some other fixed rule growing out of
our own peculiar habits and institutions." Lester v. Frazer, 2 Hill's Eq.
529 (S.C. 1837).
68. CARDOzO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150 (1921).
69. "For law is the just distinction between right and wrong, made
conformable to that most ancient nature, the original and principal regu-
lator of all things, by which the laws of men should be measured, whether
they punish the guilty or protect and preserve the innocent." II CicERo,
LAws 5. 433. (Bohn 1853); "Is it not the duty of the court, if it possess
the power, to decide in accordance with present day standards of wisdom
and justice rather than in accordance with some outworn and antiquated
rules of the past?" Justice Sutherland in Funk v. United States, 290
U.S. 371, 381, 382, 78 L.Ed. 369, 375, 93 A.L.R. 1136 (1934).
70. "It is often the function of the courts by their judgements to es-
tablish public policy where none on the subject exists. But overthrow by
the courts of existing public policy is quite another matter. That its
establishment may have resulted from decisional, rather than statutory,
law is immaterial. Once firmly rooted, such policy, in effect, becomes
a rule of conduct or property within the state. In the exercise of proper
judicial restraint, courts should leave it to the people, through their
elected representatives in the General Assembly to say whether or not it
should be revised or discarded." Justice Legge in Rogers v. Florence
Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 106 S.E.2d 258 (1958).
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harm than any possible alternative." 71 Thus, in any given
situation, the interest sought to be protected must be con-
sidered in the light of the need for certainty in the particular
area. Property law, contracts, commercial transactions, are
primary fields for legislation, restatement and code, for in
these areas rights are established in reliance upon rules, and
are valueless if the pertinent rules cannot be depended upon
to remain stable. "But where the questions are not of in-
terests of substance, but of the weighing of human conduct
and passing upon its moral aspects, legislation has accom-
plished little . . . for the certainty attained by mechanical
application of fixed rules to human conduct has always been
illusory." 72  Thus, the ideal judicial decision would combine
logic and actuality to arrive at a median rule providing the
best of stability and currency. But the law is not a machine,
and as Justice Holmes stated:
The actual life of the law has not been logic; it has been
experience. The felt necessities of the time, the preva-
lent moral and political theories, intuitions of public
policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which
judges share with their fellow men, have had a good
deal more to do than the syllogism in determining
the rules by which law shall be governed. 73
One of the earliest cases in South Carolina expressing a
policy and philosophy of stare decisis was decided in 1812.
In the case of Shecut -v. McDowelI,74 Judge Nott stated a rule
of adherence which appears to be without logical or practical
flaw:
Our Act of Assembly, passed in the year 1712, says
the common law of England shall be as in full force and
virtue in this State as in England ... I do not mean to
say that we are bound by every decision made by the
courts of England. We have a right to take our own
view of the common law; but when a principle of law
has been settled for ages, by a series of uniform de-
cisions, the reason must be very strong, that would au-
thorize a departure from it; and in no case ought an
71. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS 33 (1959).
72. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 69, 71
(1959).
73. HoLMES, THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881).
74. 1 Tread. Const. 35 (S.C. 1812).
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established rule be given up without substituting another
in its place. It would be launching into a boundless sea
of uncertainty; without a compass to direct our course.75
In 1837, a similar view of the impact of the English common
law upon South Carolina was adopted by Chancellor Johnson,
who further limited adherence to the English law in holding
that, "The Act of 1712, while incorporating the body of Eng-
lish common law into our jurisprudence, renders it obligatory
no further than it is applicable to our own conditions and
circumstances; and in applying the rules, we must take care
that they do not violate some other fixed rule growing out
of our own peculiar habits and institutions."76  However,
ninety years later, in 1927, the South Carolina Supreme
Court took a more restricted view of its ability to interpret
and amend the common law. In passing upon the question
of a wife's liability for the funeral expenses of her husband,
the court found that the wife had no duty to provide for
this expense at the common law, and that, "Where there has
been no legislative action, we must look back to the common
law, for the principles of the law there stated are of force
in this state, until there has been some repeal or modification
thereof by the law-making body.' 7 However, four years later,
the ruling of Shecut v. McDowell 78 was revived and the
strictness of this last ruling was somewhat modified in State
v. Wilson,7 0 in which it was stated that "the courts of this
state, in construing the common law, are not bound by the
decisions of the courts of England."80
If the rule of stare decisis is to be relaxed at all, the area
of law requiring the greatest degree of flexibility and change,
and thus the area in which the rule would have the least
application, would be that of the negligent tort. The con-
cept of negligence is such that the Reasonable Man may
change his character as quickly as juries change, and the
legal concepts of what interests of the individual in- per-
sonality and property should be protected are in a constant
state of development. Thus, the South Carolina Supreme
75. Id. at 38.
76. Lester v. Frazer, 2 Hill's Eq. 539 (S.C. 1837).
77. O'Hagen v. Fraternal Aid Union, 144 S.C. 84, 141 S.E. 893, 57
A.L.R. 397 (1927).
78. 1 Tread. Const. 35 (S.C. 1812).
79. 162 S.C. 413, 161 S.E. 104, 81 A.L.R. 580 (1931).
80. 162 S.C. 413, 161 S.E. 104, 81 A.L.R. 580 (1931), quoting from
Shecut v. McDowell, 1 Tread. Const. 35 (S.C. 1812).
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Court had no difficulty with the question of common law prec-
edent in allowing the wife to bring an action for enticement.
In Messervy v. Messervy, the court stated that "In view of
the sweeping changes made by modern legislation in regard
to the property and personal rights of married women, I
fail to see any reason why her husband should be joined with
her in the action."'  The Married Women's Property Act
8 2
did not specifically grant this cause of action to the wife;
unless by implication of statute and other circumstances,
the action could not have been established on any certain
authority. But the South Carolina Supreme Court has since
stated that the common law cannot be abrogated by implica-
tion of statute, and that the language must express a clear
and unequivocal intention to change the rules of the common
law.13 Page v. Winter not only involves the same change of
personal and property rights upon which the holding in
Messervy v. Messervy was predicated, but the action in Page
v. Winter was based upon a negligent act. It would be il-
logical to suggest that an individual acts negligently in re-
liance upon established rules of law relating to negligent
conduct, or, in particular, that one who negligently injures a
husband does so safe in the knowledge that he will be liable
only to him, and not to his wife. The only possible reliance
upon this rule has been the acts of settlement and judgments
by attorneys which did not account for this element of dam-
ages, and change, without regard for this store of litigation,
might give rise to a number of suits for recovery.
It is interesting to note that the English courts also regard
the common law as a body of rules which ceased to develop
at some unspecified time."- While the date of congealing is
designated by statute in South Carolina, 5 it is difficult to
determine when the case law of England ceased to be their
common law and became simply the reapplication of formerly
established rules. It is also difficult to understand how
81. Messervy v. Messervy, 82 C.C. 559, 64 S.E. 753, 755 (1908).
82. Married Women's Property Act of 1895, S.C. CoNsT. of 1895 art.
17, §9.
83. Coakley v. Tidewater Construc. Co., 194 S.C. 284, 9 S.E.2d 724
(1940).
84. "At the common law, the consortium and servitium of the 'wife
were the property of the husband, any encroachment on which conferred
on him a cause of action in the nature of trespass. The husband's right
being deeply entrenched by authority, and the wife's never having been
affirmed, the intervention of the legislature would be ncessary to produce
equality." Best v. Samuel Fox Co., Ltd. (1951), L.R. 2 K.B. 639.
85. S.C. REV. STAT. 1872, c.146, §10.
19631
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many of the basic rules of the common law can be applied
if the common law is to remain unchanged. "It has been
said so often as to have become axiomatic that the common
law is not immutable but flexible, and by its own principles
adapts itself to varying conditions."86 The rule of stare
decisis as applied in the Page v. Winter case completely de-
feats the possibility of developing case law, and as a practi-
cal fact, legislation is not likely to be forthcoming in this area.
It can hardly be argued that legal certainty in South Caro-
lina is dependent upon the marital rights of the medieval
wife. Inherently, domestic relations and negligent injuries
are not susceptible to the rule of stare decisis '7 and even if
it were definitely established that the wife had no right to
her husband's consortium at the common law, there would
be reason enough to discard the old rule, but in the ample
precedent of this state, and in the principles of legal philoso-
phy relating to the concept of stare decisis.
Whether or not this interest is sufficiently substantial to
be compensable is another question, not considered directly
in Page v. Winter. Though the action has served the hus-
band for many years, it is possible that the South Carolina
Supreme Court has found the interest to be unprotectable. If
this is true, then perhaps the rule established in the case will
not be strictly applied. Clearly, such an unequivocal denial
of change would end the developing case law of this state,
and just as clearly, the court has no intention of effecting
that end.88
These precedents are venerable. Their chains may be
moss encrusted and rusty, but only a few courts have
held that they no longer control or confine. Thus again
we reach the conflict that divides us, for the law, as
Dean Pound put it, must be stable, and yet it cannot
86. Litwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 97 L.Ed. 593 (1953).
87. "There are not many rules in tort law as to which one may say
that there is no better reason for their existence than that they were
laid down by Lord Mildew three centuries since, at a time when the
world was a very different place, but they do exist." PROSSER, TORTS
§17 (1955).
88. "Counsel desiring to attack or argue against a decision of this
court, with a view to asking the court to review, overrule or modify the
same, must petition the court in writing, at least four days before the call
of the case in which such argument is to be made, asking permission to do
so, and set forth the reasons why the decision in question should be re-
viewed, modified or overruled." S.C. Sup. CT. R. 8 §10.
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stand still. Were we to rule on precedent alone, were
stability the only reason for our being, we would have
no trouble with this case. We would tell the woman to
begone, and to take her shattered husband with her, that
we no longer be affronted by a sight so repulsive. In
so doing, we would have vast support from the dusty
books. But dust the decision would remain in our
mouths through the years ahead, a reproach to law and
conscience alike. Our oath is to do justice; not to per-
petrate error. 89
D. REECE WmLLAMS III
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